University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

3-26-1954

People v. Baker
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Baker 42 Cal.2d 550 (1954).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/620

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

550

PEOPLE V. B.\KER

[Crim. No. fiii35.

In I3unk.

Mar. 2G, H)54.]

THE PEOPLE, ReSpOllo.ent, v. "\VILBERT BERNARD
BAKEIl, Appellant.

)

[1] Homicide-Evidence-Participation in Crime Charged.-Jury's
conclusion in an uxoricide case that defendant struck fatal
blows is sustained by evidence that he was in house at time
of wife's death and that he was in front room with her shortly
after blows were struck; by £sct that except for his statements implicating another man, made at a time when defense
claims he was in a clouded state, there is no evidence that
anyone else except children was in or about house at time
of offense; and by further fact that while he told police
officers he had chased an intruder out front door, the children
testified that front door was locked from inside and that
they did not hear their dog barking at any time during night
in question.
[2] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Weight of Evidence.-It is for jUf'Y to resolve conflicts in evidence and to
determine inference.! t.o be drawn therefrom.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Presnmptions and Inferences-Sanity.-Jury
could not reasotlably infer from defendant's conduct at an
uxori('ide trial that he was sane at time of offense where
he was not brought to trial for more than two years after
death of hIS wife, where during that period he was confined
in a mental hospital and was not brought to trial until
superintendent of hospital certified that he had recoYerl'd
his sanity so as to be able to assist counsel in conduct of
his trial, and where there was no showing that defen,l<1nt"s
mental condition was same at time of his trial as it was
immediately after death of his wife.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences-Sanity.-On
trial of issue raised by plea of not guilty by reason of insanity,
there is a rebuttable presumption that defendant was sane
at time crime was committed, and defendant has burden of
proving his insanity by preponderance of evidence.

[4] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 70 et seq.; Am.Jur., Ed·
§ 215.
McK. Dig. References: [1] HomICide, § 153; [2] Criminal Law,
§ 658(6); [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 359(8); [5] Criminal Law,
§ 359(9); [6, 8, 13, 14] Criminal Law, § 793; [7] Stipulntions,
§28; [9,10,12] Criminal Law, §::!6; [11] Criminal Law, §403;
[15] Homicide. § 198; [16, 19] H'll1licide, § 2G8; [17] Criminnl
Law, §§ 25, 37; [18] Homicide, § 196; [20] Criminal Law, § 717j
[21] Homicide, § 267.
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[5] Id. - Evidence - Presumptions and Inferences - Insanity.Proof that defendant was afflicted with a permanent insanity,
as distingUished from a temporary or transient insanity, prior
to commission of crime charged will dispel presumption of
sanity and raise a presumption that his insanity continued to
exist until time of commission of crime.
[6] Id.-Instructions-Presumptions-Insanity.- Where defendant's insanity prior to killing his wife is shown by evidence
that he had repeatedly been diagnosed as an epileptic with
clouded state and psychosis, that he had been adjudicated an
insane person and thrice committed to state mental hospital,
and that he was on parole from hospital at time of crime,
and where he was similarly adjudged insane shortly after
crime was committed, jury should be instructed that proof of
permanent insanity prior to commission of crime raises a
presumption that such insanity continuE:d to exist until time
of offense.
[7] Stipulations-Effect.-Although defendant cannot complain of
joinder of his pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity where his counsel stipulated that the two pleas
could be tried together, he did not by his stipulation waive
any errors that might have been committed, as a result of
joinder, by court in instructing jury.
Criminal Law-Instructions-Presumptions.-Instructions in
an uxoricide case relating to presumptions of defendant's
banity were contradictory and ambiguous where jury was first
instructed that only conclusive presumptions are not rebuttable. then that on issue raised by plea of not guilty he is
conclusively presumed to have been sane at time offense was
committed. and next that all persons are presumed to intend
the usual and probable consequences of their acts.
Id.-"Sonnd Mind" and ''Legal Sanity" Distinguished."Sound mind" and "legal sanity" are not synonymous' terms;
a person is "legally sane" if he knows nature and quality
of his acts and their wrongfulness, if any, whereas a "sound
mind" is a healthy and robust mind. neither diseased nor
injured.
Id.-"Sound Mind" and "Legal Sanity" Distinguished.-The
distinction between soundness of mind and legal sanity is
impliedly recognized in Pen. Code, § 26, whicb provides that
lunatics, idiots and insane persons are not capable of committing crimes; and since it is expressly provided in Pen.
Code. § 21. tbat idiots and lunatics are not of sound mind,
if soundness of mind and legal sanity were synonymous the
express provisions of § 26. ext'mpting idiots and lunatics from
criminal responsibility. would be superfluous because they
would necessarily be included within provision exempting the
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[l1J Id.-Evidence-Menta.l State.-While evidence of a mental
infirmity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and
should be considered by jury on questions of premeditation
and deliberation, if defendant has a "sound mind" he would
not have a mental infirmity making him incapable of premeditating or deliberating.
[12J Id.-Moronity.-Although moronity and mental condition
caused by epileptic seizures, unless they amount to unconsciousness, are not included within exempting provisions of
Pen. Code, § 26, nevertheless they may indicate some lack
of a healthy and robust mind and have bearing on question
of capacity to premeditate and deliberate.
[13J Id.-Instrnctions-Presumptions.-It is error to instruct jury
in an uxoricide case that on trial of issue of not guilty defendant is conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind"
where evidence shows that he is a moron and has been for
many years subject to epileptic attacks affecting his mental
faculties in varying degrees and for varying lengths of time,
where only evidence pointing to premeditation and deliberation is testimony of his children that he threatened his wife
earlier in evening in question. but there is evidence that prior
similar threats were made just before he had an epileptic
seizure and that, when not suffering such an attack, he had
a friendly and harmless disposition, and where, following the
killing, defendant did not attempt to hide the body or to
mutrilate it to prevent iopntifiMtion
[14J Id.-Instrnctions-Presumptions.-An instruction in an uxoricide case that on trial of issue of not guilty defendant is
conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind" creates an
irreconcilable conflict with other instructions that jury could
consider defendant's mental state in determining whether he
had the "intent" necessary to constitute malice aforethought,
premeditation or deliberation. and that a person might be
"legally sane" and yet be in an abnormal mental or nervous
condition, and because of such condition might be less likely
or unable to hold a speciflc intent or a certain state of mind.
which is an essential ingoredient of a certain crime.
[15] Bomicide-Instructions-Intoxica.tion.-In an uxoricide case
it was prejudicial error to give an instruction based on the
first sentence of Pen. Code, !i 22. declaring that no act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of such intoxication, without also
givin!! second sentence of code section. that, whenever motive
or intent is a necel'sary element to constitute any particular
species or de!!ree of crime, jury may consider the intoxication,
where there was evidence that defendant had voluntarily taken
an overdose of both dilantin and phenobarbital on n'ight of
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killing, where both of these drugs were described as having
an intoxicating effect similar to that of alcohol, and where
there was testimony that when defendant took dosages of these
dnlgs he acted groggy. like a "drinking man."
[16] Id.-Appeal-Harmless a.nd Reversible Error-Instructions.
-Error in failing to give an adequate instruction on intoxieation in an uxoricide case was not overcome by another instruction that, even if jury found defendant sane. such a
ftnding would not preclude then from finding that his mental
or nervous condition was sucn that he was incapable of deliberation or premeditation. where such instruction did not
inform jury of weisht to be given to defendant's intoxication
but was responsive to defendant's defense that he was ineapable of premeditation because of his moronity, his psycho-"
logical disorders. and mental deterioration caused by his
epilepsy.
.
[17] Oriminal Law-Unconsciousness: Intoxication.-Unconsciousness is a complete, not pnrtial. defense to a criminal charge
(Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5), and although voluntary intoxication may at times amount to unconsciousness. yet it can only
have e1fect of negating specific intent. the applicabll' section
being § 22 and not § 26. subd. 5.
I.
[18]
Homicide-Instructions-Onconsciousness.-Wherl' there wns
t
ample evidence in an uxoricide case of voluntary intoxi('ntil;a
and also evidenoe that defendant was unconscious at time
of offense because he was in "clouded state" of an epileptic
attack. it is proper to give an instruction based on Pen. Code,
126. subd. 5, since defendant's complete defense based on
unconsciousness was entirely separate from his partial defense based on intoxication.
[19] Id.-AppeaJ-HarmlesB a.nd Reversible Error-Instructions.
-Error in failing to give an adequate instruction on intoxication in an uxoricide case was prejudicial, notwithstanding
fact that defendant knowingly took his own pills. which had an
intoxicating effect. to ward off an attack of epilepsy, where
it was a question for jury whether or not the imminent approach of such an attack was sufficipnt to render hiB taking
the pills compulsive and thus in'l"oluntary. and where effect of
instruction!l given was that ;nry could consider defendant'.
intoxication only if they found that it was caused in'l"oluntarily
and that it produced nnl!onseionsness.
[10] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Requests-Limitations OD Rule.
.~.
-It is incumbent on court in a criminal case to instruct jury
. " on its own motion, chal"ging them fully and fairly on law
relating to facts of case .. and it is not relieved of duty to
live instructions whose necessity is developed through evidence
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introduced at trial merely beclluse such instructions are not
requested.
[21] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-Where facts revealed by circumstantial evidence in an
uxoricide case show case to be a very close one on questions
of guilt, sanity and premeditation, and where numerous errors,
particularly those relating to instructions, substantially and
prejudicially affect rights of defendant, a reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Keru
County and from an order denying a new trial. William
L. Bradshaw, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposiug
death penalty, reversed.
Henry E. Bianchi for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and James D. Loebl,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant Wilbert Baker was charged by
information with the murder of his wife, Clara Baker, 011
April 21, 1951. He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity. A doubt arose in the mind of the court
as to the defendant's present sanity, and a trial on that issue
Was held on June 25, 1951, before a court sitting without a
jury. Defendant was adjudged insane and was committed
to the Mendocino State Mental Hospital under section 1370
of the Penal Code. On March 19, 1953, the superintendent
of that hospital certified that defendant had recovered his
sanity, and on March 27, 1953, he was returned to the sheriff
to be held for trial. (Pen. Code, § 1372.) By.stipulation,
the issues raised by the pleas of not guilty and not guilty by
reason of insanity were consolidated for trial. The jury returned verdicts that defendant was guilty of murder in the
first degree, without recommending life imprisonment. and
that he was sane at the time the offense was committed. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. His motion
for a determination of his present sanity, pursuant to section
1368 of the Penal Code, was also denied, and he was sentenced
to death. The appeal to this court is automatic. (Pen.
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
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Defendant was born and spent most of his life on an
Arkansas farm. He had no formal schooling and cannot read
or write. Tests performed at the i\lendocino hospital. after
the death of his wife, indicated that he is a moron with an
intelligence quotient of about 70. Defendant's family moved
to California in 1940. and ultimately settled in Bakersfield.
where they lived at the time of the alleged offense. Defendant
and his deceased wife had three children, Larry. Bob. and
l\Ierlene, who were 8, 10 and 12 years old respectively at the
time of their mother's death. Defendant and his wife worked
as agricultural laborers. when they were able to do so. His
wife suffered from a back ailment for which she had undergone two operations, and defendant has a severe form of
epilepsy that had prevented his working at a regular em~; ployment during the four or five years preceding his wife's
death. His activities were confined to caring for the yard
about their house, and his in-laws testified that he did a poor
job of that. Defendant had his first epileptic seizure at the
age of 15, and they have continued intermittently ever since.
.. (Defendant was 44 years old at the time of the trial.) These
seizures did not, however. interfere with his employment
until 1944 or 1945. when they began to increase in frequency
and severity. Defendant received occasional treatment at the
Kern General Hospital for severa] years ~hereafter. and. on
the advice of its doctors. he quit working. His condition hecame progressively worse until. in 1948. he was examined by
Dr. Richard Loewenberg. Chief Visiting Psychiatrist at the
Kern General Hospital. after having a particularly severe
•. seizure. Dr. Loewenberg diagnosed him as an epileptic with
. clouded state and equivalentsl and prescribed dilantin and
phenobarbital. anticonvulsant medicines used to control
epilepsy. Several days later defendant had another severe
,;; 'The clouded state is an equivalent or substitute for the epileptic! con·
YUlsion. Dr. Loewenberg, in his testimony at the trial, defined the
clouded state as follows: "Clouded state means a narrowing in of the
7 lltate of consciousness in which from a !uperficial observation of the
Vpatient, he doesn't seem to have anything wrong with him at all. He
, can move about. He might be able to talk. He can do all kinds of
-; itemized actione. That means like winding a watch, taking a cigarette.
, There are hundreds of minor movemente and motion! that everybody
; does even without thinking about. But there are ·eertain lacke of in~ hibitions. They enn get extremely aggressive and violent. . .. A clouded
; state can last from a v('ry short period ot time to many days, and once
: in a while into weeks."
It was also stated, by both doctors who took
:.' part in the trial, thnt an epileptie would have no recollection of what
~oeC!urred while hI' "'n~ in a ~lOlldcd stnte, that he would not be mentan,
i~onaible for his actions durini that tim..

)
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seizure and was again taken to the Kern General Hospital
and, on the recon:mendation of Dr. Loewenberg, he was ('om·
mitted to Camarillo State Mental Hospital. There he was
diagnosed as an epileptic with clouded state, convulsive seizures, and psychosis. He was later paroled from Camarillo
to the care of his wife. The evidence indicates that on his
return from that institution his condition was much better
for se\'eral months, but the clouded state and seizures returned, gradually increasing in frequency and severity until
he was again committed to Camarillo. Between the years
1948 and 1951, he was committed to Camarillo three different
times. After each commitment, he was paroled to his wife,
and he was still on parole at the time she was killed. During
these years he remained in the care of Dr. Loewenberg and
continued to take the medicines that he prescribed. After a
little experimentation, the dosage was fixed at three-four
capsules of dilantin (one and one-half grains each) and one
phenobarbital tablet (one and one-half grains) per day.
Clara Baker was killed at approximately 1 a. m., April
21, 1951. During the day of April 20, 1951, defendant stllyed
at home taking care of six or seven of his wife's sister's
children, while she worked in the potato sheds. Defendant
was alone with the children in the early afternoon, when he
had a seizure and fell out the back door. As he regained
consciousness, he found one of the little girls rubbing his
face with a wet cloth. He went intQ the house and lay on
the dh'an in the living room. The child put a cold wet cloth
on his forehead, as she had seen defendant's wife do. Clara
Baker returned home at 4 in the afternoon, accompanied by
several women from the neighborhood, who left shortly tIl ercafter. Defendant's children returned from school at 4 :30.
HIS daughter, Merlene, noticed that her father looked sick.
At defendant's request, his son Bob gave him some of his
medicine. Bob made an error and gave defendant Clara's
pills, and he took them by mistake. He also took his own
pills, and there is evidence that he took an overdose of pills
later in the evening. Defendant and his wife had planned to
go to a show that night, but Clara told him that he ditln't
look well and that they shouldn't go. At her suggestion lJe
lay on the divan for awhile. Defendant rerr.ember~ nothi"g'
after that until he "a"'akcned" in the Kern General ITospitnl
three days later. Although dcfenllant had no recollection of
it, it was established that about 6 p. m. he cnEed on lli<;
brother Robert, who 1ived two bloc.:ks away, to borrow money
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for the show. Robert Baker testified that defendant was
staggering when he was at his house and that, as defendant was Leaving, he staggered Illto the door facing. He helped
defendant out, and told him to go straight home. The evidence
indicates that he did return home directly. and that he remained there the rest of the evening.
During the evening of April 20th defendant's children
were listening to the radio. They testified that their parents
were bickering over trivial matters, as they had often done
in the past. Defendant was complaining because they had
not gone to the show, and because he wanted the family car
to make a trip to Arkansas. The testimony of the children
, indicated that the quarrel was neither serious nor heated,
but they also testified that at one point defendant threatened
to kill Clara. There was further testimony that defendant
had so threatened Clara several times in the past, and that
the threats always occurred when defendant's seizures were
) becoming so severe that Clara would suggest that he return
h.'
to Camarillo. Clara never seemed frightened by his threats
i and often remarked, as she did on the night of April 20th,
that he should "go ahead and get it over with." The children went to bed and to sleep around 10 or 10 :30. At that
time, Clara was lying on the divan in the living room because
its hardness would relieve her backache, and defendant was
sitting on a chair in the kitchen with his feet propped up
on another chair.
Sometime during the night, defendant's youngest child,
L: Larry, was awakened by an unusual noise, "kind of like a
pig. " He went into the living room where he found defendant
t· standing by the divan on which his mother was lying. She
f did not move or speak, and the child saw blood running down
her nose and onto the floor. Defendant told the boy to
"get back to bed before I knock hell out of you." From
his bed Larry could see into the kitchen, and almost immediately he saw defendant go through the kitchen, in which
a light was on, and out the back door. Defendant returned
in half a minute, stayed in the kitchen for a short time, went
out the back door again and did not return. . Larry testified
that he did not have auything in his bands when he saw him
in the living room or when be passed through the kitchen
to go out the back door. After defendant left the house the
second time, fJarry awakened his brother and sister. Merlene
,approached the divan to speak to her mother and got blood

r
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on the robe she was wearing. The children decided to go
to an uncle's house a few houses away, but before they left
Merlene notired that a small paring knife was missing from
the kitchen. The children testified that as they left the house
they found the front door locked from the inside by a wooden
latch. On their way out Merlene, who was barefooted, stepped
on a burning cigarette butt on the walk between their front
porch and the street. None of the children recalled having
heard their dog bark at any time that night. They went to
their uncle's house, and the police were called.
The police arrived at the Baker house at approximately
1 :20 a. m., April 21, 1951. They found Clara Baker lying
on the divan in the living room. The autopsy surgeon testified that death had been caused by two violent blows on
the head. The wounds had bled profusely, and there was
much blood over her face and body and on the floor under
the couch. The right side of her skull, behind and below the
ear and at the base, was extensively fractured. The nature
of the wounds indicated that the blows were struck by a
weapon "that had both something of an edge and some
weight. " The autopsy surgeon thought that the weapon was
probably an "ordinary hatchet" or an axe.
Defendant was arrested at his brother Robert's house two
blocks away. After he had left his owr ''"'~e the second.
time. defendant had apparently proceeded, l . , ,\'U an alley that
ran alongside the house. then through a field to an irrigation
canal into which he fell or jumped. He climbed out of the
canal and went to his brother's house. Robert testified that
defendant was wet from head to foot and was in "pretty bad
shape" when he arrived. He helped him into the house and
onto a sofa. Defendant told Robert. "We have to get over
to the house." and Robert thought he also mumbled something
about chasing someone. When the officers arrived a short
time later, defendant was unable to stand by himself. In
the police car. defendant told the officers that he did not kill
his wife, that the killer was a "great big man about four
feet tall." The police did not take defendant to jail. but
took him to the Kern General Hospital. They did so, they
said, because there appeared to be something wrong with him
and because he was irrational and incoherent.
The police searched the Baker house and the surrounding
area. The canal was drained and the bottom raked for
one-half block on either side of the point at which defendant
went into it. The Bakers' outside toilet was moved and the
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septic tank was pumped. The murder weapon was never
found. The small paring knife that was missing from the
Bakers' kitchen was found in the canal, but the prosecution
admitted that it could not have been the murder weapon.
Two of the officers followed defendant's tracks to the canal.
They did so with the aid of one of defendant's shoes that
had been taken from him at the time of his arrest. These
two officers testified that defendant's tracks were the only
fresh ones going down the alley and through the field, and
that he appeared to be walking. On cross-examination, it
was brought out that the alley was a hard-packed dirt path
that was well-traveled, and that defendant's were not the
only tracks in the field going toward the canal. One of the
officers admitted that he could not say positively that del fendant was not chasing someone down the alley, and the
! other officer, although contending that there were no other
fresh tracks, admitted that he was .. mainly interested" in
~ those of the defendant when he searched the alley. Plaster
;. casts were not made of defendant's or any other tracks.
tf' Defendant's clothes as well as a hatchet that was found in
the Baker house were sent to the laboratory. There was
testimony that the hatchet had no traces of blood, and that
; it did not appear to have been washed. In the People's
It closing argument, it was admitted that there were no blood
stains on defendant's clothing. No effort was made to clean
defendant's fingernails to determine if he had had blood on
his hands since they were last cleaned. No evidence was
introduced of any fingerprints taken in the Baker house.
'~
At 2 :35 on the afternoon of April 21st, Dr. Loewenberg
, interviewed defendant at the Kern General, Hospital. He
testified that defendant's tongue was coated, his left eyelid
lWollen, and his speech "glossy" and incoherent. Defendant
:,. told Dr. Loewenberg that he had taken too much medicine,
, that he didn't remember what had happened, that he couldn't
see, that he didn't know where his wife was, that she was
~"'lying in the back bedroom and "[A] man with a black mask
came in, I don't know what he was.. Might be the guy who
i stole the orange trees. I'm not gomg crazy. I took four
~; capsules today. Bring Dr. Loewenberg here. He is the guy
, who told me to take four capsules. • • • Where is my wife'
: She should be up here by now. They can't keep me here.
, I'm no criminal. I took too much of that medicine.••• I
; want to know about my wife and kids. • . ." Dr. Loewen~~I testified that defendant was definitely in a clouded IItate

t
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at the time of this interview, and that his incoherence was
not caused by an overdose of medicine. After this interview
the doctor advised the police that they could talk with defendant that evening, but he warned that defendant was
quite •• drowsy and dazed."
A deputy sheriff and an investigator from the district
attorney's office interviewed defendant that evening. The
deputy sheriff, who testified about this interview, said that
defendant didn't talk rationally, that he acted drunk, and
appeared not to be well. He testified that defendant couldn't
remember his age, but said that he could remember part of
what had happened the preceding evening. Defendant said
that he and Clara had been quarrelling, that each had taken
a bath and Clara had lain on the divan in the living room
while defendant went to bed in the back bedroom. He asked
Clara to join him, but she refused. Defendant then went
to sleep, and woke up hearing a noise in the living room. He
got up to investigate, saw a man run out the front door, gave
chase and wound up in the canal. After the interview, the
deputy sheriff told defendant's parole officer from Camarillo
that he was "personally satisfied that [defendant] was not
mentally responsible at the time of the offense." The same
officers also interviewed defendant on April 23d, after he
had apparently regained consciousness. Defendant did not
remember the previous interview. The deputy sheriff said
that defendant still did not look well.. He told defendant
that Clara was dead, and asked him if he had killed her.
Defendant replied, "I might have, but if I did I don't remember it." He said that he was unable to remember anything after 4 :30 on Friday afternoon (April 20th) when
his son had given him some medicine and Clara had persuaded him to lie down for awhile. Dr. Loewenberg also
saw defendant on April 23d. He testified·that defendant
had torn his bed sheets into strips and tried to hide them.
Although his speech was no longer glossy, he was unable to
touch his finger to his nose in one motion. Defendant again
complained about his eyes, saying that he had not been able
to see for three weeks and that he had told his wife about it,
but she had not believed him.
During his stay in the Kern General Hospital, defendant
was observed having several convulsive seizures and periods
of unconsciousness. On May 29, 1951, the court appointed
three doctors to examine defendant to determine his sanity.
All three doctors concluded that defendant had epilepsy with

I
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clouded state, and that he was insane at the time of the offense
and was then unable to determine the difference between
right and wrong. All three recommended his commitment
to a mental hospItal for the criminally insane.
Considerable evidence was mtroduced of defendant's medical history. This history showed that he has had epileptic
seizures and periods of unconsciousness since he was 15 years
of age. During the five-year period preceding his trial, he
was conSIstently diagnosed by a number of doctors, psychiatrists, and neurologists as an epileptic with clouded state and
equivalents. Sometimes the word "psychosis" was added to
the diagnosis. The doctors also agreed that a person with
such a dlsease could be dangerous, but that he had probably
been released from Camarillo because it was thought that,
with regular dosages of anticonvulsant medicines, he would
be. relatively harmless. The limitations of the hospital's facilities and personnel were also a factor in this decision. Dr.
Loewenberg, who had treated defendant more than any other
doctor, said that in his opinion, on the basis of the defendant's
history and his condition on the day following the crime,
defendant was not mentally responsible at the time of Clara's
death, that he was in a clouded state at that time. Defendant's children testified that he frequently had "spells" and,
although he appeared to them to be all right on the evening
before Clara's death, the doctors testified that his seizures
and clouded states could come on very quickly, in the space
of a few minutes. The records of the Mendocino hospital
showed that defendant was diagnosed there as an epileptic
. with clouded state and equivalents. and with. psychosis. These
. records also show that Dr. R. S. !Wod, superintendent of
that institution, agreed with this diagnosis and thought that
defendant was in a clouded state at the time of the offense.
In his testimony at the trial, however, Dr. Rood said that
he doubted whether that diagnosis was correct. His doubts
arose, he said, because neither the records of Mendocino nor
those of Camarillo disclosed that defendant had been observed
in an epileptic seizure. He testified, however, that there were
80 many inmates in the yards of these institutions and so few
attendants that seizures could easily go unnoticed. Defendant
testified that he could remember having several seizures in
each institution. In addition, the records of the Kern General
Hospital contain several entries showing that nurses and doctors had observed defendant in a seizure, and Dr. Loewenberg
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had seen him in a clouded state on at least one oce;lSion.
Furthermore, as the defense pointed out, all during defend- ,
ant's stay at both Camarillo and Mendocino he was given
regular medication designed to reduce or prevent convulsive
seizures. Dr. Rood also intimated that he thought defendant
might not be an epileptic at all, but might have a heart disease
known as paroxysmic tachycardia, or hysterical seizures, or
he might be malingering. On cross-examination he admitted,
however, that it was unlikely that a person with defendant's
I.Q. could successfully malinger undiscovered for so long a
period of time, and that it was unlikely that the 20 or more
doctors who had diagnosed him were wrong. It should also
be noted that Dr. Rood was not associated with the Mendocino
hospital and did not see defendant until January, 1953, less
than three months before defendant was returned to Kern
County to stand trial. So far as the record shows, Dr. Rood's
connection with defendant after January, 1953, was limitcc1
to participation in one staff conference in February anLl
another in March, 1953.
There was also considerable evidence about the nature of
the drugs defendant took by prescription. The experts were
agreed that both dilantin and phenobarbital were hypnotic
drugs and, if taken in overdose, could be dangerous since
they would remove the inhibitions of the person taking them.
There was testimony that these drngs had an intoxicating
effect similar to that of alcohol, and that defendant oft('n
acted drunk after taking his pills. There was also testimony
that an overdose of these drugs could accelerate or aggravate
the clouded state condition of an epileptic because persons
in a clouded state lack normal inhibitions and sometimes
become extremely aggressive and violent.
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction of first degree murder, that it was
not shown that he committed the crime, and that, even if it
could be inferred that he did, it was not shown that the murder
was deliberate and premeditated.
Defendant points out that no blood was found on his person
or on his clothes, that the murder weapon was never found,
although an extensive search was conducted, and that the
presence of the kitchen knife in the canal and the qualified
character of the police officer's testimony a bout the tracks
in the alley and the field, all tend to corroborate his statement that he chased an intruder and fell into the canal.
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[1] Although the evidence is weak and there are many
unexplained and apparently uninyestigated items of evidence
pointing away from defendant's guilt, the record supports
the conclusion that defendant did in fact strike the fatal
blows. It is undisputed that he was in the house at the
time of his wife's death and that his statements as well as
his son's placed him in the front room with his wife shortly
after the blows were struck. Except for defendant's statements, made at a time when the defense claims he was in a
clouded state, there is no evidence that anyone else except
the children "as in or about the Baker house at the time of
the offense. Shortly after the crime, defendant told police

i
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officers
that hetestified
had chased
an intruder
outwas
the locked
front door.
that the
front door
from
The children
" the inside. They also testified that they did not hear their
dog barking at any time during the night. In support of
k his contention that it was not proved that he did strike the
~
r. blows, defendant points to Merlene's testimony about stepping
U on a lighted cigarette in the path leading from their front
r porch to the street. Defendant testified that he had run out
of cigarettes in the afternoon and had not smoked that
evening. One of the children testified, however. that de, fendant was sitting by the kitchen stove smoking sometime
( after dinner. The jury could reasonably have concluded that
~: defendant ran aronnd the house and intentionally or acci", dentally dropped the cigarette when he ran out the first
time after his son Larry was awakened. [2] It was for the
jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine
, the inferences to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Daugherty,
. 40 Ca1.2d 876. 884-885 [256 P.2d 911] ; People v. Green,
,13 Ca1.2d 37, 42 [87 P.2d 821] ; People v. Perkins, 8 Ca1.2d
t.·. 502, 510 [66 P.2d 631] ; People v. Watts, 198 Cal. 776, 789
! [247 P. 884]; People v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315, 326 [184
t P. 389].)
[3] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient
to support the verdict that he was sane at the time the offense
was alleged to have been committed. The positive evidence
i was overwhelming that defendant was not sane, but the
~. People contend that the "personal appearance, mannerisms
~. and actions of the defendant before the jurors during the
~, trial. and the character of his testimony and manner of giving
kit, were matters properly considered by" the jury (People
:'. ''Y~ Chamberlain, 7 Cal.2d 257. 230-261 [60 P.2d 299]) and
>"ere sufficient to support the verdict of, sanity. This conteD-
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tion cannot be sustained. Defendant was not brought to trial
for more than two years after the- death of his wife. During
that period he was confined in a mental hospital and was not
brought to trial until the superintendent of the mental hospital certified that he had recovered his sanity so as to be
able to assist counsel in the conduct of his trial. There was
no showing whatever that defendant's mental condition was
the same at the time of his trial as it was immediately after
the death of his wife. Under these circumstances the jury
could not reasonably infer from defendant's conduct at the
trial that he was sane at the time of the offense.
The People also rely on the rebuttable presumption of
sanity. [4] On the trial of the issue raised by the plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity. there is a rebuttable presumption that defendant was sane at the time the crime
was committed (People v. Myers, 20 Cal. 518; People v. Loper,
159 Cal. 6, 11 [112 P. 720, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1193] ; People v.
Williams, 184 Cal. 590,593 [194 P. 1019] ; People v. Hickman,
204 Cal. 470, 477 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117] ; People v. Leong
Fook, 206 Cal. 64. 67, 70 [273 P. 779] ; People v. Chamberlain, 7 Cal.2d 257, 260 [60 P.2d 2991) and defendant has
the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 901 [256
P.2d 911). [5] Proof that defendant was amicted with
a permanent insanity, as distinguished from a temporary or
transient insanity, prior to the commission of the crime
charged will, however, dispel the presumption of sanity and
raise a presumption that his insanity continued to exist until
the time of the commission of the crime. (People v. Farrell,
31 CaL 576, 581; People v. Francis, 38 Cal. 183, 188-191;
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 518-519 [36 P. 16) ; People v.
Schmitt, 106 Cal. 48, 53 [39 P. 204] ; People·v. Findley, 132
Cal. 301, 307 [64 P. 472]; People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794,
800-801 [175 P. 6) ; State of Oregon v. Garver, 190 Ore. 291,
299-309 [225 P.2d 771J and authorities cited; see 8 Cal.Jur.,
§ 143; 27 A.L.R.2d 121; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
§ 212 [11th ed., 1935].} [6] In the present case, there was
ample evidence to establish defcndant's insanity prior to the
killing of his wife. He had repeatedly been diagnosed as
an epileptic with clouded state and psychosis; he had been
adjudicated an insane person and thrice committed to the
Camarillo State Mental Hospital, and he was on parole from
that hospital at the time of the crime. He was similarly
adju~ed insane shortly after the crime was committed.
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Although we cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence
defendant's burden of proving that he was insane
at the time of the offense, the jury should have been instructed
that proof of a permanent insanity prior to the commission
of the crime raised a presumption that such insanity continued to exist until the time of the offense.
[7] Defendant also contends that the joint trial of his
pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity so
t confused the issues that defendant's right to a fair and imf partial trial was prejudiced. Defendant's counsel, however,
stipulated that the two pleas could be tried together. Although
~'. defendant cannot complain of the joinder as such (see People
v. Hazelwood, 24 Cal.App.2d 690, 692 [76 P.2d 151] ; People v.
Pettinger, 94 Cal.App. 297, 300-301 [271 P. 132]; see also
People v. Dessaner, 38 Cal.2d 547, 554 [241 P.2d 238]), he
did not by his stipulation waive any errors that might have
,- been committed, as a result of the joinder, by the court in
instructing the jury.
The court instructed the jury in part as follows: "A presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to
be made from particular facts. Unless declared by law to be
conclusive. it may be controverted by other evidence. . • .
di~charged

t",:

"Upon the trial of the issue raised by the plea of not guilty,
the defendant is conclusively presumed to have been sane at
the time the offense is alleged to have been committed. . . .
"A person must be presumed to intend to do that which
he voluntarily and wilfully does in fact do, and must also
be presumed to intend the natural, probable and usual conse;: quences of his own acts. Tberefore when one person assails
another voluntarily with a dangerous weapon likely to kill,
and which does in fact destroy the life of the person assailed,
" the presumption is that such assailant intended death or
. other great bodily harm.
"Any such presumption as I have mentioned, however,
~',',. may be overcome by contrary evidence; and any such evi~
denee is sufficient to overcome it which creates in the minds
of the jurors a reasonable doubt that the defendant's intent
~. was as so presumed. In the absence of evidence to the con[ trary. the presnmfltion mnst prevail.

t:
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"There has been testimony concerning the mental state
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of the defendant at the time of the offense charged against
him in the information, and you will be instructed as to the
law concerning the test of insanity as a defense to a criminal
charge. Before you determine whether or not the defendant
was legally sane or insane at the time of the offense alleged
against him in the information, however, it will be necessary
that you first determine his guilt or innocence.
"In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
you are to be governed by the conclusive presumption that
the defendant was sane at the time the offense was alleged
to have been committed. A conclusive presumption, as a
matter of law, is not rebuttable. Therefore the conclusive
presumption that the defendant was sane and of sound mind
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the
information is not rebuttable, and if yo:!! are convinced from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did unlawfully kill his wife, •.. then you must find the
defendant guilty, even though you, as jurors, may have some
doubt as to the present soundness of mind of the defendant,
or some doubt of the soundness of mind of the defendant at
the time of the commission of the crime, as charged in the
information. This means that he is presumed to have the
legal capacity to commit the act so far as sanity is concerned
but it does not preclude you from finding that the mental
state of the defendant was such that he did not have the
intent necessary to constitute the crime.
"The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime charged in the information and has also entered a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby alleging that
he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense
charged in the information. After the issue raised by the
plea of not guilty is determined it will be necessary for you
to determine the issue raised by the plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity if you should find defendant guilty of
the crime charged in the information, because the law does
not hold a person criminally accountable for his conduct if
at the time thereof he was insane.
"The sole issue for you to determine in regard to the
insanity plea is whether or not the defendant was sane or
insane at the time of the commission of said otfense. You
must determine the condition of his mind at the precise time
of the criminal conduct if he is found guilty of such crime . • •

.

"The burden of proving insanity is
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"The law presumes that the defendant was sane. That
presumption may be rebutted but is controlling until overcome by a preponderance of the evidence as, when weighed
with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from
which it results that the greater probability of truth lies
therein.

.
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"You are reminded, however, that a person might be l<.'gally
sane, as we define the term in dealing with the question of
criminal responsibility, and yet be in an abnormal mental
, or nervous condition; and because of such condition he might
be less likely or unable to have or to hold a specific intent
or a certain state of mind, which is an essential ingredient
, of a certain crime. We have received evidence bearing on
.! the mental and nervous condition of the defendant at the
, 'time of the alleged commission of the crime charged. Such
evidence may be considered by you in determining whether
;. or not the defendant did any overt act, charged against him,
,', and, if so, whether or not, at that time, there existed in him
,~ the specific mental factor which, as you have been instructed,
,tmust accompany that act to constitute a certain crime or
:, degree of crime."
, [8] These instructions are confused, contradictory. and
ambiguous. They did not inform the jury in clear and un'; mistakable terms of the principles that must guide their
: deliberations; in particular, they did not inform the jury
',what part of the evidence bearing on defendant's mental
. condition was applicable to the several issues submitted to
~them. The jury was first instructed that only conclusive
)resumptions are not rebuttable. It was then declared that
: on the issue raised by the plea of not guilty, defendant is
,:, eonclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the
"offense was committed. Next, several presumptions are men'tioned relating to the general proposition that all persons
presumed to intend the usual and probable consequences
:'of their acts. The court then stated. "Any such presumption
, 18 I have mentioned, however, may be overcome by contrary
>,evidence .•. " (Italics added.) The court had just men,~tioned the conclusive presumption of sanity; and the quoted
'.:statement is in direct contradiction to the earlier statement
';.that conclusive presumptions are not rebuttable. The re': ..w.nder of the statement just quoted-CO any [contrary) evi:'.4ence ia sufficient to overcome [the presumptions that have
...
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been mentioned,] which creates in the minds of the jurors a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's intent was as so presumed "-may indicate that the court meant only that the
presumptions that men intend the usual and probable consequences of their acts could be overcome by contrary evidence.
The statement is susceptible of this construction, but the
apparent contradiction involved must be weighed with the
other elements of confusion and ambiguity that are discussed
below.
Immediately after the instructions just discussed, the
jury was again instructed that on the issues raised by the plea
of not guilty, defendant is conclusively presumed" sane and
of sound mind at the time of the commission of the crime
charged. . . . [I] f you are cominced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did unlawfully kill his wife, . . .
then you must find the defendant guilty, even though you,
as jurors, may have some doubt as to the present soundness
of mind of the defendant, or some doubt of the soundness of
mind of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
crime, as charged in the information. This means that he
is presumed to have had the capacity to commit the act so
far as sanity is concerned but it does not preclude you from
finding that the mental state of the defendant was such that
he did not have the intent necessary to constitute the crime."
(Italics added.) By the use of the word "intent" in the last
phrase and in other instructions. it is clear that the court
meant the intent involved in the elements of malice aforethought, premeditation. and deliberation. It is also clear
from the context that the court used the phrase "sound mind"
as the equivalent of legal sanity. for it was said that on the
trial of the issue of not guilty a person is conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind." [9] "Sound mind" and
"legal sanity" are not synonymous. Indeed, in the instructions
explaining legal sanity to the jury in this case the phrase
"sound mind" was not used. As has been long established, a person is legally sane if he knows the nature and
quality of his acts, and their wrongfulness. if any. (People
v. Kimball, 5 C~I.2d 608, 610 [55 P.2d 483] ; People v. Keaton,
211 Cal. 722, 724 [296 P. 609].) "Soundness" of mind is
defined as "free from flaw. defect or decay, perfect of the
kind; undamaged or unimpaired; healthy, not diseased or
injured, robust-said of body or mind." (Webster's New
Internat. Diet., p. 2403.) [10] The distinction that these definitions draw between soundness of mind and legal IIBDiV iI
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impliedly recognized in section 26 of the Penal Code, which
provides that lunatics, idiots, and insane persons are not
capable of committing crimes. It is expressly provided in
section 21 of the Penal Code that idiots and lunatics are
not of sound mind; yet, if soundness of mind and legal sanity
are synonymous, the express provisions of secti.on 26 exempting idiots and lunatics from criminal responsibility would be
superfluous because they would necessarily be included within
the provision exempting the insane.
[11]' The prejudicial nature of the instruction appears
most clearly in the difficulties that it creates for the jury in
the application of the rule stated in People v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d
330, 346-358 [202 P.2d 53], that evidence of a mental infumity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and
should be considered by the jury on the questions of premeditation and deliberation. If the defendant has a "sound
mind," that is, "a healthy and robust mind, neither diseased
nor injured," it necessarily follows that he would not have
a mental infirmity making him incapable of premeditating
or deliberating. If an idi.ot or a lunatic were charged with
f
a crime, an instruction that he was conclusively presumed
~. to be of "sound mind" would create an obvious conflict with
his statutory defense. [12] Although moronity and the mental
~. condition caused by epileptic seizures, unless they amount to
unconsciousness, are not included within the exempting provisions of section 26 of the Penal Code, nevertheless these conditions may indicate some lack of a "healthy and robust
.•'. . mind" and do have bearing on the question of the capacity
to premeditate and deliberate. [13] In the present case, evidence introduced by the People as well as by defendant shows
that defendant is a moron and has been, for many years, subject to epileptic attacks affecting his mental faculties in varying degrees and for varying lengths of time. At the trial. defendant testified that he did not remember anything that
happened the night his wife was killed. One of his defenses
was that if he killed his wife, which he did not remember
doing, he did it while under the influence of an epileptic
attack. Defendant claims that this condition amounted to
legal insanity or, alternatively, that it nep'atived any elcment
of premeditation or deliberation. The only evidence pointing
to premeditation and deliberation is the testimony of the
Baker children that defendant threatened his wife earlier in
the evening. There was also testimony that defendant had
threatened hia wife '. life several times during a three- or
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four-year period preceding the offense. But each of the several persons who testified about such threats qualified their
testimony by saying that the threats were made just before
defendant had an epileptic seizure or when defendant's epileptic condition had become so aggravated that his return
to the Camarillo hospital was imminent. There is no evidence
that during the intervals when defendant was free from the
clouding effects of his disease, he had any animosity toward
his wife or that he had ever harmed her. Further, the evidence is uncontradicted that defendant, when not suffering
an attack of epilepsy, had a friendly, sunny, and harmless
disposition, and there is no evidence that the Baker family
life was anything but harmonious during the intervals defendant was free from the effects of his disease. In addition,
there is the fact that when the Baker children went to bed
on the night of the crime, the Baker household was peaceful.
Clara was resting on the divan in the living room, and
defendant was sitting propped up on two chairs in the
kitchen. Their bickering about attending a show and about
defendant's proposed trip to Arkansas had stopped.
Defendant's conduct after the killing also points away
from premeditation. He did not attempt as did the defendant in People v. Eggers, 30 Ca1.2d 676 [185 P.2d 1],
to hide the body or to mutilate it to prevent identification.
Defendant claimed that he chased an intruder down the
alley, and there is evidence of hallucinations in his medical
history. Furthermore, defendant did not attempt to hide
himself. Instead, he went almost immediately to his brother's
house, where his only intelligible words were, "We have got
to get over to the house." His brother, as well as the police
officers who arrested him, testified that defendant was irrational and incoherent at this time. The police officers took
him to the hospital rather than to jail. D~. Loewenberg,
who visited defendant at the hospital some 13 hours after
the crime. testified that defendant was then in a clouded
state, and that, in his opinion, he was in a clouded state at
the time of the killing. It was thus a very close question
of fact whether or not the People had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was "willful, deliberate,
and premeditated." It was, therefore, vital that the jury
be properly instructed in clear and unambiguous terms. It
was error for the court to instruct the jury that on the trial
of the issue of not guilty, defendant was conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind." The effect of such an instruc-
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tion was to tell the jury that it could not consider defendant's
moronity and the effect on his mental faculties of many years'
suffering from epilepsy in determining his defense based on
lack of capacity to premeditate and deliberate.
[14] Furthermore, this instruction creates an irreconcilable conflict with the subsequent instruction that the jury
could consider defendant's mental state in determining
whether he had the "intent" necessary to constitute malice
aforethought, premeditation, or deliberation. The instruction
also creates an irreconcilable conflict with the last paragraph
of the court's instruction on defendant's plea of not guilty
· by reason of insanity. After the jury was instructed
.. on .the issues raised by this plea, that defendant has the
· burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the
: evidence (People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 901 [256 P.2d
~91l]), and that there is a rebuttable presumption that de· fendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of
~: the offense (People v. Ohamberlain, 7 Ca1.2d 257, 260 [GO
.P.2d 299]), the jury was then "reminded, however, that a
.• person might be legally sane . • • and yet be in an abnormal
:: mental or nervous condition; and because of such condition
might be less likely or unable to have or to hold a specific
; intent or a certain state of mind, which is an essential ingre; dient of a certain crime. • • • [Evidence 1rearing on defend. ant's mental or nervous condition] may be considered by
. you in determining whether or not the defendant did any
overt act charged against him and, if so, whether or not. at
~that time, there existed in him the specific mental factor which,
18 you have been instructed must accompany that act to
,'eonstitute a certain crime or degree of crime." There is thus
.:_ "irreconcilable conflict in the instructions, arid we are not
\.t h"berty to speculate as to which of them the jury followed.
t[Citations.]" (People v. Deloney, 41 Ca1.2d 832, 829 [264
·:P.2d 532].)
~:;, [15] Defendant also complains of another instruction relAting to the issue of premeditation and deliberation. lIe
'aontends that the trial court erred in failing correctly to
;'instruct the jury on the effect of his intoxication on the
·:,question of the intent with which he committed the acts
ebarged. The jury was given an instruction 2 bascd on the
~~
~~'.' ·"Our law provides that 'no act committed by a person while in a
te of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having
in such a condition.' This rule applies to intoxication from any
wlum voluntariq produced bl the perSOJl later char,ed with the
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first sentence of section 22 of the Penal Code: "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition." Defendant contends the court erred in not givin~ an
instructionS based on the second sentence of section 22: "But
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose.
motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any
particular species or degree of crime. the jury must take into
consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at
the time. in determining the purpose. motive. or intent with
which he committed the act." This sentence has been interpreted to include intoxication by drugs as well as by intoxicating liquors. (People v. Sameniego, 118 Cal.App. 165, 173
[4 P.2d 809. 5 P.2d 653] : People v. 'Lim Dum Dong, 26 Cal.
App.2d 135, 140 [78 P.2d 1026].) In Peopl.e v. Coyne, 92
Cal.App.2d 413 [206 P.2d 1099], the trial court had instructed 'the jury in the language of the first sentence of section 22
only. In reversing the judgment of conviction of first degree
murder, the District Court of Appeal said: '" [I]n determining whether or not the killing was so willful, deliberate,
and premeditated as to constitute murder in the first degree,
it is proper for the jury to consider how much his mental
condition at the time was affected by intoxication, and. there
being an express statutory declaration upon the subject of
intoxication, a defendant in a murder case is entitled to have
an instruction embracing such statutory declaration given
crime; and it means that such intoxieation. it shown by the evidence
to have existed in the defendant when he allegedly committed the crime
charged, is not of itself a defense in this ease. It may throw light on
the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place, but when a
person in a atate of intoxication. voluntarily produced by himself, com·
mits a crime auch al that charged against the defendant in this case.
the law does not permit him to use his own vice as a ahelter against the
normal. legal consequences of his conduct." (CALJIC No. 78·.!..)
·Such as CALJIC No. 78·B, "However. when the existence of any
particular motive, purpose or intent is a neeessary element to constitute
a particular kind or degree ot crime. the jury. in determining whether
or not such motive. purpose or intent existed in the mind ot the accusrd.
must tnke into consideration the evidence oft'ered to prove that the
accused was intoxicated at the time wben the crime allegedly was ~om·
mitted.
"Thus in the crime of murder in the first degree, it is a necessary
element ot the crime that the killing be willful, deliberate and premeditated. This tact requires an inquiry into the Btate ot mind under
which the defendant committed the act charged. if he did commit it.
In pursuing that inquiry, it is proper to consider whether he was iDe
toxicated at the time of the alleged offense. The weight to be give.
the evidence on that question nnd thl' significanee to attach to it in re~
tiGa *- aB UIe other evidence are exelusiveq within 70ur pro"riMeo"
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by the court to the jury where there is evidence which makes
it applicable; and, for the refusal of the court to give the
instruction under discussion the judgment must be reversed
and 8 new trial ordered.' . . . The fact that an instruction
on intoxication (though inadequate) was given, indicates that
the trial judge had satisfied himself that the evidence was . . .
sufficient to put the question • within the province of the jury.'
His judgment on this question would seem to settle all doubts
on the matter. . . . The failure to give the instruction in
the language of section 22 was unquestionably prejudicial
error." (92 Cal.App.2d at 416-417, quoting People v. Hill,
123 Cal. 47. 52 [55 P. 692] : see also People v. Vincent, 95
Cal. 425, 428 [30 P. 581] ; People v. Griggs, 17 Cal.2d 621, 625
[110 P.2d 1031] ; People v. Blake, 65 Cal. 275,278 [4 P. 1];
People v. Sanchez, 35 Ca1.2d 522. 527-529 [219 P.2d 9].)
In this case there was ample evidence of intoxication in the
record to raise a question of fact for the jury. There was
-evidence that defendant had voluntarily taken an overdose
'of both dilantin and phenobarbital on the night of the killing.
Both of these drugs were described as hypnotics. as having
the effect of removing the inhibitions of the person taking
them, and as having an intoxicating effect similar to that of
Alcohol. There was testimony that when defendant had taken
dosages of these drugs he acted groggy, like a "drinking

man."

ij The factual issue was thus raised. and the court's failure
" instruct the jury that it could consider defendant's intoxiJation by drugs in determining whether or not defendant
~mmitted the offense with premeditation and deliberation Wa!
Jighly prejudicial. Indeed, the prejudicial effect of the
r&ilure to instruct was enhanced by the inadequate instruction
ven-that defendant's acts were no less criminal by reason
the fact that he was intoxicated at the time he committed
"em. The giving of such an instruction without adding that
..efendant" ;ntoxi,.t;on ,ould. however. be .ons;dered ;n
~etermining the degree of the offense committed. had the
~e effect as if the jury were told that defendant's drugged
.,ndition could not influence their decision on any issue sub'tted to them. Defendant's defense on the theory of intoxi.
tion-the difference between first and second degree murder
,,'W88 thus completely negatived by the instructions of the
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overcome by other instructions given by the court. The first
of these 4 was a part of the instructions on insanity, which
informed the jury that even if they found defendant snne
such a finding would not preclude them from finding that hi~
mental or nervous condition was such that he was incapable
of deliberation or premeditation. This instruction did not
inform the jury of the weight to be given to defendant's
intoxication. Instead, it was responsive to defendant's defense that he was incapable of premeditation because of his
moronity, his psychological disorders, and the mental deterio_
ration caused by his epilepsy. The defense based on intoxication raised an entirely separate issue and should have been
covered by a separate instruction. (Of. People v. Sanchez,
35 Ca1.2d 522, 528 [219 P.2d 9].) The other two instructions, which the People claim overcome the error in
failing to instruct on intoxication, informed the jury that
there is a rebuttable presumption of consciousness, II that an
act committed by a person in a state o~ unconsciousness is
not a crime, and that the "involuntary intoxication produced
by drugs or spiritous liquors" is an example of the unconsciousness that negates criminal responsibility.s (Italics
"'You are reminded, however, that a person might be legally eline,
u we define that term in dealing with the question of criminal respon~i
bility, and yet be in an abnormal mental or nervous condition; and
because of such condition he might be less likely or unable to have or to
hold a specific intent or a certain state of mind, which is an essenthl
ingredient of a certain crime. We have received evidence bearing on
the mental and nervous condition of the defendant at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime charged. - Such evidence may be considered by you in determining whether or not defendant did any o'l'"crt
act charged against him and. if so, whether or not, at that time, there
existed in him the specific mental factor which, as you have been instructed, must accompany that act to constitute a certain crime or degree
of crime."
"'When the evidence shows that a defendant acted as if he was conseious, the law presumes that he then was conscious. This presumption
is disputable, but is controlling on the question of consciousness until
overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. ;.• The rule of law jn.t
announced does not change, or make an exception to, the law whirh
places upon the people the burden of proving defendant's guilt beyon,1
a reasonable doubt." This instruction was specifically disapproycd 1'1
this court in People v. Hardy, 33 Ca1.2d 52, 63-64 [198 P.2d 86.:>1. In
the present case, however, the instruction was requested by defcntbnt
and the error was therefore. invited •
•, 'When a person commits an act without being conscious thereof, he
docs not thereby commit a crime even though such an act would constitute
a crime if committed by a person when conscious.
"The condition of unconsciousness to which this instnlCtion refrrs
is by law distinguished and clarified from insanity, which is also in
issue here, but is to be decided by you separately.
"The etate of unconsciousness to which I refer in this present instruo-
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added.} [17] Unconsciousness is a complete, not a partial,
defense to a criminal charge (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5), and,
although voluntary intoxication may at times amount to unconsciousness, yet it can only have the effect of negating
specific intent, the applicable code section being section 22
and not 26, subdivision 5. (People v. Anderson, 87 Cal.App.2d
857,860-861 [197 P.2d 839] ; People v. Sameniego, supra, 118
Cal.App. 165, 173.) [18] In this case there was ample evidence
of voluntary intoxication, and there was also evidence that
defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense because
he was in the "clouded state" of an epileptic attack. The
evidence of unconsciousness being present, the instruction
based on Penal Code, section 26, subdivision 5, was properly
given, for defendant's complete defense based on unconsciousness was entirely separate from his partial defense based on
.intoxication_
[19] It is contended, however, that defendant was not
"~.ily intoxicated "because he took his pills and capsules
ward off an attack of epilepsy, and because he took hill
's pills by mistake," and that, therefore, his defense
adequately covered by the instruction on the effect of
This contention cannot be sustained. There
evidence of the nature of his wife's pills and thus
from which the jury could infer that those pills had
an intoxicated or unconscious condition. The fact
defendant took his own pills, which are conceded to have
intoxicating effect, to ward off an attack of epilepsy may
may not mean that defendant was involuntarily rather
voluntarily intoxicated. It is conceded that defendant
the pills knowingly, but whether or not the imminent
.~lnlDr()ach of an epileptic attack was sufficient to render his
a'fu'-'-", compulsive and thus involuntary was a question for
jury. Moreover, the fact that the court did give an
instruction on voluntary intoxication was enough
a doubt in the minds of the jurors. Although we
t hesitate before holding that the absence of any instrucvoluntary intoxication in a situation such as that
.1prE~e]lted in this case is prejudicial error, when a partial

.v.....

is a condition experienced by a person normally sane, wherein there
no functioning of the conscious mind •.. I shall cite a few examples
this type of unconsciousn~ss to whieh this instruction refers: 8omnam·
_ .• ; the delirium eaused by fever, involuntary intoxication
by drugs or spirito us liquors; and restricted consciousness caused

"
)

)

576

-)

PEOPLE t1. BAltER

[42 C.2d

instruction has been given we cannot but hold that the failure
to give complete instructions was prejudicial error. The facts
and the partial instruction given might well lead the jury to
believe that defendant's intoxication was not involuntary, but
the effect of the instructions given was that the jury could
consider defendant's intoxication only if they found that it
was caused involuntarily and, further, found that it produced
unconsciousness. If the jury found that defendant was voluntarily intoxicated, the instructions told them to disregard
that condition in arriving at their verdict. That such instructions were in error is beyond question, and that they were
highly prejudicial cannot be doubted.
It is finally contended that the trial court had no duty,
on its own motion, to give an instruction based on the second
sentence of section 22 of the Penal Code. Defendant admits
that he did not request such an instruction, but argues that
the trial court was obligated correctly to instruct the jury
on all the factual issues raised by the evidence presented.
[20] As has been repeatedly held. .. It is incumbent upon
a court in a criminal case to instruct the jury of its own
motion, charging them fully and fairly upon the law relating
to the facts of the case. [Citations., The court is not relieved of the duty to give instructions whose necessity is
'developed through the evidence introduced at the trial.'
[Citation.] An instruction is necessary if it is vital to a
proper consideration of the evidence by the jury. [Citations.]
. • . The circumstances of the case determine whether the
failure to instruct the jury constitutes prejudicial error."
(People v. Putnam, 20 Ca1.2d 885. 890, 892 [129 P.2d 367];
see, also, People v. Warren. 16 Ca1.2d 103, 117 [104 P.2d
1024] ; People v. HoZt, 25 Ca1.2d 59. 64 [153 P.2d 21] ; People
v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164. 176 f163 P.2d 8].) A proper
consideration of the isaues developed through the presentation
of the evidence at the trial of this case required that the jury
be instructed on the possible effect of voluntary intoxication
on the state of mind with which defendant did the acts
charged. (People v. Sanchez. 35 Ca1.2d 522. 527-529 [219
P.2d 9].) Moreover, this is not a case where there was a
complete failure to instruct, but a case where partial instructions were given and, as given, were erroneous. The instructions given directed the jury's attention away from the vital
issue raised by defendant's contention that he was not voluntarily intoxicated. Their verdict was. therefore, "uninstructed
as to the law reIatiDe to the facts of [the] ease [and] eanBOt
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be sustained merely because proper instructions ,,"ere not
·:requested." (People v. Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2<l 164, 176.)
; [21] Since the facts revealed by the evidence, entirely
circumstantial in nature, show the case to be a very close one
_ on the questions of guilt, sanity, and premeditation, we must
; conclude that the numerous errors reviewed herein suhstan; tially and prejudicially aft'ected the rights of defendant.
"'. Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage
. of justice.
; _ The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion
~. for
new trial are reversed.

a
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Gibson, C. J., Carter, .J., and Schauer J., concurred.

J

}:':' Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
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